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We are a nation that has a government—not the other way 
around. And this makes us special among the nations of the 
Earth. Our government has no power except that granted it 
by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of 
government, which shows signs of having grown beyond the 
consent of the governed. It is my intention to curb the size 
and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand 
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to 
the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or 
to the people. 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of Purpose 
This paper will argue that beginning with President Reagan 
the adoption of unitary theory as a central tenet in presidential 
administrations created a now ongoing consolidation of executive 
regulatory authority. This consolidation of power has considerably 
accelerated over the course of the last four decades. As Courts 
continue to defer to the executive in decisions made within the broad 
grants of power delegated by Congress, the relevance of the 
legislative body dwindles. The checks on executive assumption of 
power have largely been removed. The wall between the executive 
and the administrative have crumbled, and what were once 
considered unofficially separate branches are merging. This 
convergence of both the power to enforce and create the laws has no 
other outcome but to create significant questions of power allocation 
and constitutionality in immigration law and beyond. This idea will 
be explored through the historical evolution of United States 
                                                          
2 Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, The American Presidency Project, 
3/11/2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246336.  
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immigration law, the executive’s expansions of power, and the 
gradual rise of the modern American administrative state.  
B. Brief Discussion of Modern Expansions of Presidential 
Power 
When first elected, President Reagan minced no words 
regarding his intent during the first of his inaugural speeches in 
January of 1980. He intended to reduce the scope of the federal 
government and remit powers he saw as usurped by it to the states.  
This position could be described as reactionary and a culmination of 
the events of the previous three decades. The Presidency had been 
aggressively expanding its powers since President Truman sought 
to contain Communism in the Korean peninsula. 3 Truman, though, 
pushed the boundaries of presidential authority enough to have the 
Supreme Court draw a line still applicable to evaluations of 
presidential authority today.4 President Kennedy further 
consolidated foreign policy decisions in the presidency with 
unilateral decisions on major events of the early 1960’s, including 
the Bay of Pigs invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis. 5  President 
Johnson continued to consolidate foreign policy into the hands of 
the presidency, but he also looked inward with his “Great Society” 
programs.6 President Johnson had sought, and largely succeeded, in 
legislating this expansion of civil rights and government services 
                                                          
3 See, e.g. Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War 
Power, 81 Indiana Law Journal 1199 (2006).  
4 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
5 See, e.g. David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 Southern 
California Law Review 477, 538 (2008)   
John F. Kennedy, he reports, cut the National Security Council and 
Joint Chiefs out of the advising loop, preferring to confer only with his 
“inner club.” Kennedy blamed the Bay of Pigs fiasco on bad advice 
from the Joint Chiefs; and, after their advice on the Cuban missile crisis 
proved inferior to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's strategy, 
McNamara increasingly came to believe that he and his systems 
analysts could plan a war better than the military.  
6 See, e.g., Peter Feuerherd, How Great Was the Great Society?, JSTOR, 
January 4, 2017, last accessed 03/07/2019, https://daily.jstor.org/how-great-was-
the-great-society/  
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from the White House.7 All of these presidents pursued unpopular 
wars which were entered into and expanded on the back of a 
Congressional resolution instead of a Congressional declaration of 
war.8 
With Nixon’s resignation, the revolt against the expansion 
of presidential power began in earnest. The Supreme Court denied 
President Nixon Executive Privilege in forcing him to hand over the 
Watergate tapes.9 This was a major rebuke of unlimited Presidential 
powers and Nixon’s “Imperialist Presidency.10” In addition, 
Congress bristled at the thought of a Presidency left unchecked and 
enacted legislation, such as the War Powers Act and National 
Emergency Act, meant to curb Executive power through 
Congressional oversight.11 Presidents Ford and Carter fought 
                                                          
7 See, e.g. Bruce Miroff, Presidential Leverage over Social Movements: the 
Johnson White House and Civil Rights, 43 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 2 (1981).   
8 See, e.g., Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1637, 1656 (2000) Explaining that every military engagement since 
World War II had been authorized by presidential action, not by a Congressional 
declaration of war; Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, The Commander-in-Chief, 
and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems 933, University of Iowa College of Law (2007) 
Discussing the history of presidential authorization through the George W. Bush 
administration and the effect of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 667 (2006) on 
executive authorization authority. 
9 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)  
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for 
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can 
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from 
judicial process under all circumstances. 
10 See, e.g. Thomas E. Cronin, A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial 
Presidency, 95 Political Science Quarterly 209, 209(1980).  
The “imperial presidency” meant many things to many people. But it 
especially suggested the abuse and misuses of presidential powers. By 
1973 it became an accepted term to describe presidential deceptions, 
lying, and transgressions against cherished notions of separation of 
powers. A deep-seated skepticism set in as an increasing number of 
Americans lost confidence in President Nixon. 
11 See, e.g., David S. Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balance—The 
Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW 
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contractions of Presidential authority throughout their terms.12 With 
the election of President Reagan, a new approach to consolidation 
of power in the Presidency arose. For President Reagan to 
unilaterally reduce the size of government, he had to simultaneously 
assert his power over all administrative offices created through the 
power of the executive. The Reagan administration justified this 
through the idea that the power of administrative agencies created 
under the banner of the Presidency sprang from the power of the 
Executive alone.13 In claiming this, President Reagan could issue 
directives to those agencies directing how they operated.14  This was 
President Reagan’s implementation of the unitary theory of the 
presidency.15 
This places the discussion firmly on the path to the 
Presidency of Donald Trump and the continued efforts by his 
predecessors to consolidate power into the hands of the Executive. 
Since the resignation of President Nixon and the contraction of 
Presidential powers under Presidents Ford & Carter, Presidential 
powers have been steadily expanding.16 As the first President to 
                                                          
214 (1983); L. Elaine Halchin, National Emergency Powers, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, Last Accessed 03/07/2019, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf  
12 See, e.g. Phillip Shabecoff, Presidency is Found Weaker Under Ford, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, March 26, 1976; Ann Mari May, Fiscal Policy, Monetary 
Policy, and the Carter Presidency, 23 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 699 
(1993).  
13 See, e.g. Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative Over Agencies and 
Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s 




16 See, e.g. Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory 
Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 227 (2016); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving 
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 515 (2015); Jon D. 
Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1023 
(2013). 
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make unitary theory a centerpiece of their administrative 
philosophy, President Reagan resumed what Nixon had been forced 
to stop via Watergate and his resignation.17  Over the next four 
decades, Presidents would continuously usurp Congressional power 
to control and shape policy.18  
The longstanding deference of Congressional and Executive 
control of immigration policy are starting to be supplanted by issues 
concerning separation of powers.19 As the Presidency assumes ever 
increasing authority over the federal bureaucracy—what many had 
termed the “fourth branch of government”—the checks and balances 
envisioned by the founders have been rendered ineffective.20 This is 
particularly true in today’s hyper-partisan political climate. In 
immigration law, these issues were most recently exposed as Trump 
v. Hawaii made its way through the judicial process where it was 
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. 21 The decision itself 
should not have been surprising to students of history.  
To understand why the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump 
v. Hawaii should have been unsurprising to informed observers, it 
                                                          
17 See, e.g., Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory 
Reform: The Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, 
293 (1985). 
18 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW, 2245 (2001)  Illustrating the consolidation of administrative authority 
through the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton presidencies; William P. 
Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why 
It Matters, 88 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 505 (2008) Providing a brief 
overview of the history of presidential power expansion.  
19 For additional reading on court deference in the immigration sphere, see, e.g., 
Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, THE UNIVERSITY 
OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, vol. 74, 1671 (2007). 
20 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation 
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) 
(describing agencies as the fourth branch of government). 
21 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018). “Moreover, plaintiffs' request 
for a searching inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President's justifications is 
inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference traditionally 
accorded the President in this sphere.” 
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is necessary to examine the Supreme Court decisions that initially 
asserted federal control over immigration vis-a-vis the states. Only 
then does it become practical to examine how that control gradually 
flowed into the office of the Executive.  
 
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY 
A. Federalism and the Beginnings of Congressional Control 
Outside of Article 1, Section 8 the Constitution was silent on 
immigration.22  Immigration policy was largely left unregulated for 
the first hundred years of American existence. That changed when 
the Supreme Court issued one of its first major immigration ruling 
in 1875.23 The Passenger Cases of 1849 would provide the vehicle 
for that decision and laid important groundwork for the Supreme 
Court to justify federal regulation of immigration policy. The 
Passenger Cases were a series of consolidated cases arising from an 
import tax disguised as an immigrant quarantine fund. These cases 
would be the first to establish Congressional authority over 
immigration policy while substantially limiting the state’s ability to 
regulate. In order to do so the Taney court looked to the Commerce 
Clause. After much discussion of the Commerce Clause’s history 
and the dangers of allowing the states to regulate foreign commerce 
individually, the court concluded that “the Constitution has 
conferred on Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the States.24 25” The state law “must oppose 
what has been actually done or prescribed by Congress, and in a case 
                                                          
22 Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to make 
laws regarding naturalization. The document makes no mention of immigration 
otherwise. 
23 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875). This case would establish the 
federal government’s right, and only the federal government’s right, to exclude. 
The only exception was an interest of vital necessity to the state and the means 
to which the interest was protected were only wide enough to achieve it.  
24 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 562 (1849). 
25 Id.  
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where it has no reserved power to act differently from Congress.26”  
The Court goes on to cite the decision in Ogden v. Gibbons 27 
But in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of 
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several 
States. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those 
lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is 
that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to 
participate in it. “The deep streams which penetrate our country 
in every direction pass through the interior of almost every State 
in the Union, and furnish the means for exercising this right. If 
Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be 
exercised wherever the subject exists. If it exists within the 
States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port 
within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised 
within a State.28” 
From here, the majority reasoned that the power of regulating 
foreign commerce had been undertaken by Congress, stating  
Congress had created “treaties, and ha[d] regulated [the United 
States’] intercourse with foreign nations by prescribing [those 
treaties’] conditions.29” The Court would also address arguments 
made that the quarantine of undesirable immigrants was an exercise 
of the police powers granted to the state. The Court disagreed, 
describing the taxes imposed by the state as a “transit duty.30”  The 
Court strikes down the state’s ability to “pervert[] into weapons of 
                                                          
26 Id. 
27 In Ogden, the state of New York had tried to grant a single company 
monopoly over steamboat navigation in state waters. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the establishment of such monopolies interfered with Congressional power 
to regulate interstate & foreign commerce. Established the maxim that states 
could not interfere with Congressional authority to regulate commerce via 
legislative enactment. 
28 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 462 (1849) quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. 1, 74 (1824). 
29 Supra, Note 23 at 462. 
30 Id at 463. 
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offence and aggression upon the rights of others” state police powers 
which should be reserved for “self-defence and protection against 
harm”.31 Finally, the Court addresses the argument that states had 
ultimate authority to act upon any person within their jurisdiction, 
regardless of their status as a citizen of that state. The Court 
dispatches this argument by pointing to the decision in Gibbons 
reasoning that a state may attempt to “exclude all vessels but her 
own from entering her ports, and may grant monopolies of the 
navigation of her bays and rivers. This the State of New York at one 
time attempted, but was restrained by the decision of this court”.32 
 The Court would strike down these types of duty impositions 
made by the states but would leave the door open to exercise state 
police power “for the preservation of the health, the morals, or the 
domestic peace of the States”.33 Later decisions would look to close 
that door completely. 
B. Eliminating State’s Police Power Immigration Authority 
The Supreme Court would revisit this issue nearly three decades 
later in its 1875 decision in Chy Lung v. Freeman. In Chy Lung, 
California had enacted a statute allowing the state Commissioner of 
Immigration to inspect passengers seeking to immigrate into the 
United States via California ports prior to anyone disembarking 
from the ship. The commissioner was enabled to charge fees based 
on snap judgments made in his own discretion. California argued 
that the law was meant to exercise its police power to protect the 
state from acquiring the burden of care for  
[the] lunatic,  [the] idiot, [the] deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or 
infirm, [who] is not accompanied by relatives who are able and 
willing to support him, or is likely to become a public charge, or 
has been a pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or 
disease (existing either at the time of sailing from the port of 
                                                          
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id at 464. 
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departure or at the time of his arrival in the State) a public 
charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, 
or a lewd or debauched woman.34  
The Supreme Court disagreed, viewing the law as too wide in scope, 
and stated  
We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against 
the right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to 
protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and 
convicted criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite 
limit of such right, if it exist. Such a right can only arise from a 
vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the 
scope of that necessity. When a State statute, limited to 
provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone, shall, 
in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time enough 
to decide that question. The statute of California goes so far 
beyond what is necessary, or even appropriate, for this purpose, 
as to be wholly without any sound definition of the right under 
which it is supposed to be justified. Its manifest purpose, as we 
have already said, is, not to obtain indemnity, but money.35 
The Supreme Court avoided ruling directly on the scope of a state’s 
ability to defensively use its police powers but did indicate its 
willingness to do so in a later case. Regarding the right of the states 
to regulate immigration through its police power, the Supreme Court 
states, “Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its 
exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that 
necessity.36” They continue by asserting their willingness to define 
the boundaries of that scope in the next sentence, ” When a State 
statute, limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that object 
alone, shall, in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time 
enough to decide that question.37” Throughout the decision the 
                                                          
34 Supra, Note 22 at 277. 
35 Id at 280. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
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Court is hesitant to grant that the state’s right to regulate 
immigration through police power exists at all.  In terms of the 
California Statute, they strike it down stating the statute, “invades 
the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
is therefore void.38” With this sentence, the Supreme Court 
expressed its opinion that immigration authority was governed by 
the Commerce Clause and it was questionable whether states had 
any right to regulate immigration at all.  
New York would again attempt to justify an import duty on 
immigrants by amending the statute struck down in the Passenger 
Cases to reflect an inspection law. In People of State of New York v. 
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique the Court rejected that people 
were property and could be imported. The Court stated 
We know of nothing which can be exported from one 
country or imported into another that is not in some sense 
property-property in regard to which some one is owner, and 
is either the importer or the exporter. This cannot apply to a 
free man. Of him it is never said he imports himself or his 
wife or his children.39  
While the Court took time to explain why New York could not 
justify taxation of immigrants based on an inspection theory, the 
argument had become moot during the appeal process. Congress had 
fully asserted their power over immigration under the Commerce 
Clause in August of 1882 with the passage of ‘An act to regulate 
immigration.’ This act decreed “a duty of 50 cents is to be collected 
for every passenger not a citizen of the United States who shall come 
to any port within the United States by steam or sail vessel from a 
foreign country”.40 The state’s ability to levy any type of import 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 People of State of New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 
U.S. 59, 62 (1883) 
40 Id at 63. 
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charge against an immigrant arriving in a port which fell under their 
jurisdiction was effectively dead.  
C. Constitutional Challenges to the Act to Regulate 
Immigration of 1882 
Constitutional challenges would come quickly after the 
Congressional regulation of immigration duties began. These 
challenges would be consolidated in what would become known as 
the Head-Money Cases. The constitutional argument for these cases 
was presented as follows 
[A]ssuming that congress, in the enactment of this law, is 
exercising the taxing power conferred by the first clause of 
section 8, art. 1, Const., and can derive no aid in support of its 
action from any other grant of power in that instrument, 
[petitioner] argues that all the restraints and qualifications found 
there in regard to any form of taxation are limitations upon the 
exercise of the power in this case. The clause is in the following 
language: The congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide 
for the common defense and the general welfare of the United 
States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States. 41 
 
The petitioners argue that the duty imposed on immigrants entering 
the country was not established for the defense or general welfare of 
the United States and it does not affect the states evenly, and 
therefore is not uniform.  The Court responds by arguing differences 
in revenues raised or distributed do not determine whether a statute 
has been uniformly applied. The Court defines uniformity as the law  
appl[ying] to all ports alike, and evidently giv[ing] no 
preference to one over another, but is uniform in its 
operation in all ports of the United States… [p]erfect 
                                                          
41 Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (Internal quotes & citations 
omitted) 
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uniformity and perfect equality of taxation, in all the aspects 
in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream.42 
Additional arguments were levied against the act under the auspices 
of violating treaties between sovereign nations. The Court argues 
that a treaty is on equal footing with a statute created by the federal 
government. They are both regarded as a “law of the land.43” Vis a 
vis one another, since a treaty only takes the Senate and Executive 
to and statutory authority is derived from both houses of Congress 
and the Executive and superiority “would seem to be in favor of an 
act in which all three of the bodies participate.44” The Court would 
rule that “nothing in the statute by which it has here exercised that 
power forbidden by any other part of the constitution.45” In effect, 
Congressional authority to regulate immigration had been firmly 
established by the Supreme Court.  
 
D. Immigration Act of 1891 & Its Constitutional Challenges 
The Immigration Act of 1891 “establishe[d] the office of 
superintendent of immigration46” and placed it under the control of 
the Department of the Treasury.47  In Nishimura Eiku v. United 
States, the Court considered whether Congress had the power to 
appoint inferior officers in departments of the Executive. Petitioner 
in Nishimura asserted that the inspector of immigration was illegally 
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Petitioner argued that 
the Superintendent of Immigration should have made the 
appointment of the inspector. The Court rejected this argument 
stating “the constitution does not allow congress to vest the 
appointment of inferior officers elsewhere than in the president 
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.48” 
                                                          
42 Id at 595. 
43 Id at 598. 
44 Id at 599. 
45 Id at 600. 
46 Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892) 
47 See § 7, Immigration Act of 1891. 
48 Supra, Nishimura at 663. (Internal quotations omitted). 
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Nishimura also established the idea that the judiciary could not 
overrule decisions rightfully made by the legislative and executive 
branches or their rightfully designated actors in regards to 
immigration on due process grounds. The Court states,  
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that 
foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any 
domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been 
admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to 
enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of 
the legislative and executive branches of the national 
government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or 
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly 
conferred by congress, are due process of law.49  
This decision marked the beginnings of the Executive branch’s 
influence over immigration policy. It furthered the idea that the 
federal government was able to bar who it wanted so long as they 
were doing so under the legitimate authority of Congressional 
action. Additionally, those actors Congress had vested decision-
making authority within issued final verdicts that were not 
appealable to the judiciary.  
[T]he final determination of those facts may be in trusted by 
congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as in all 
others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an 
officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of 
certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the 
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless 
expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-
examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on 
which he acted.50 
                                                          
49 Id at 660. 
50 Id.  
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The proper offices to make those decisions fell “either to the 
department of state, having the general management of foreign 
relations, or to the department of the treasury, charged with the 
enforcement of the laws regulating foreign commerce.51” The 
President, as the Chief Executive, names the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Secretary of State—both departments formed 
under executive authority.52 As unitary theory became a more 
prominent idea, executive control of all subordinate offices of the 
Executive and their employees/appointees would lead to the 
President having great latitude in shaping immigration policy 
through Executive directive. 
 The Nishimura case helped establish the right of the federal 
government to do three things in the field of immigration law, (1) 
deny entry to noncitizens, (2) allowed Congress to vest decision 
making authority regarding entry in offices other than itself and 
outside the legislative branch, and (3) labeled decisions made by 
those agents as final decisions excluded from review by the 
judiciary. Shortly after this decision, the Court would again weigh 
in on the rights of the sovereign in regard to immigration, this time 
as it related to the deportation of noncitizens.  
 In Fong Yue Ting v. U.S. the Supreme Court examined the 
right of the federal government to expel noncitizens and whether this 
expulsion violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court discusses 
the right of the sovereign to choose who may remain in its lands at 
length. They ultimately arrive at the following conclusion 
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power 
affecting international relations, is vested in the political 
departments of the government, and is to be regulated by 
treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the 
executive authority according to the regulations so 
established, except so far the judicial department has been 
                                                          
51 Id at 559 
52 See Article II, § 2, Const. 
17 | P a g e  
 
authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the 
paramount law of the constitution, to intervene.53 
Here the Court grants Congress, and to a lesser extent the President, 
authority to control who may remain in the country. The Court also 
defers to the Constitution’s ultimate authority while excluding their 
right to become involved unless authorized by statute or treaty 
language to do so. Once they conclude that a sovereign does have 
the authority to expel noncitizens, the Court expands on Congress’s 
power to expel nonresident aliens at its whim stating 
Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other aliens residing in 
the United States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so 
long as they are permitted by the government of the United 
States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the 
constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard to 
their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and 
criminal responsibility. But they continue to be aliens, 
having taken no steps towards becoming citizens, and 
incapable of becoming such under the naturalization laws; 
and therefore remain subject to the power of congress to 
expel them, or to order them to be removed and deported 
from the country, whenever, in its judgment, their removal 
is necessary or expedient for the public interest.54 
In this part of the ruling the Court granted ultimate authority over 
immigration to Congress. They provide Congress the vehicle by 
which to expel and admit nonresidents. This combined with the 
authority to regulate naturalization laws as delegated under the 
Constitution gave Congress control over all the major processes 
involved in immigration.55 The last major hurdle to Congressional 
dominion over immigration would be brought under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
                                                          
53 Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) 
54 Id at 724.  
55 See Art. I, Sec. 8, Const. 
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The Court had largely laid the foundation of its reasoning on 
the question of Due Process violations in earlier decisions. The 
Court revisited this reasoning again near the beginning of Fong Yue 
Ting, foreshadowing their ultimate decision. The Court ruled 
immigration status and its adjudication did not constitute a trial and 
sentencing for, but merely an ascertainment of, an alien’s right to 
remain in country. The Court avoided a Due Process conflict by 
defining immigration outside the bounds of a normal judicial 
proceeding. Deportation was not a punishment per se, only a way 
for the sovereign to enforce “the return to his own country of an 
alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the 
performance of which the government of the nation, acting within 
its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments, has 
determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.56” As a 
political question, the Court declined to express an opinion upon 
“the wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the measures enacted by 
[C]ongress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the 
[C]onstitution”.57 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, Congressional power 
to control policies regarding immigration had been firmly 
established. The Executive’s role was also somewhat defined as 
Congress could delegate responsibilities in enforcement to certain 
executive departments, specifically the state & treasury 
departments’ head. The judiciary gave substantial deference to the 
interplay between Congress’s delegation of authority to executive 
agencies and how those agencies chose to wield it. 
The Court subjected these delegations of power to what 
amounted to a rational basis review, a relatively low hurdle to 
clear.58 The Court would also categorically abstain from weighing 
                                                          
56 Supra, Note 52 at 730.  
57 Id at 731. 
58 See e.g. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825). “The difference between the 
departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, 
and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit 
something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary 
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in on implications of policy decisions, labelling such matters 
political questions.59 This would come to be known as the plenary 
power doctrine. This scenario would set the stage for continued 
expansion of Presidential authority and influence in the sphere of 
immigration policy and enforcement. Having a judiciary reticent to 
rule on policy matters that was willing to allow Congress to delegate 
its authority to another branch would lead to an opportunity for 
executive usurpation of immigration control. While the bureaucracy 
created by executive agencies had historically been viewed as an 
unspoken fourth branch of government operating autonomously, the 
advancement of the unitary theory of the executive would see its 
autonomy weakened and then fully usurped by presidential control. 
As the executive and the administrative wings of the federal 
government became exceedingly beholden to the person holding 
executive office, the Congressional and Executive offices were 
placed squarely on a collision course with the Constitution and its 
own delegation of authority. 
E. The Shifting Sands of Federal Authority 
Prior to 1875’s Chy Lung decision, regulation of immigration 
was largely done on the local and state level. Chy Lung moved 
authority into the hands of Congress as a function of foreign 
commerce regulation.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
judiciary was in the process of moving federal justification of 
immigration control from a theory of foreign commerce regulation 
to a theory of national sovereignty. The Immigration Act of 1891 
and the Court’s opinion in Fong Yue Ting cemented the sovereign 
theory of immigration as the Court’s new view. More importantly, 
though, the Court circumvented due process considerations by 
                                                          
of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court 
will not enter unnecessarily.” 
59  The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). This case established 
the “plenary power” doctrine and highlighted an approach of deference to the 
legislative and executive branches in immigration matters. The court ruled that 
those decisions were “conclusive upon the judiciary.” 
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placing foreign nationals outside the purview of Constitutional 
protections and all but the barest of judicial consideration.  
The Court’s reticence to intervene remains relevant throughout 
this discussion and will likely need to be discarded in order to avoid 
Constitutional crisis. Pearson v. Williams 60 shows the Court’s 
hesitation to overrule both Congressional and executive agency 
decision making authority at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Congress had entirely removed the subject of immigration from the 
purview of the courts, and the courts repeatedly endorsed Congress’ 
ability to do so.61 If Congress, the Constitution, or a foreign treaty 
did not demand judicial review of an agency action, those decisions 
were final upon appeal to the treasury secretary and subject to only 
an abuse of discretion review by the court. This is a plain error 
standard and quite a high bar given the deference courts give to 
agency decision making.62  
Congress would pass several immigration acts over the course 
of the next fifty years. The first of those acts was aimed at restricting 
the inflow of immigrants from Asian countries and introduced a 
                                                          
60 Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906). Court holds that it is without doubt 
that Congress has the authority to expel noncitizens. The Court examines 
whether the commissioner of immigration can hold a second deportation hearing 
after adjudication in favor of the nonresident in the first. They rule that as a 
function of the executive and not the judicial power, immigration hearings do 
not fall under the idea res judicata. As such, it is permissible for immigrants to 
be placed under scrutiny a second time. 
61 Fok Young Yo v. U.S, 185 U.S. 296, (1902). (“By the act of August 18, 1894 
(28 Stat. at L. 390, chap. 301), the decision of the proper executive officer, if 
adverse to an allen's admission, was made final unless reversed on appeal to the 
Secretary of the Treasury”); See Also Lee Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 
538 (1895). 
62 Fok Young Yo v. U.S., 185 U.S. 296. “we think that, upon the admitted facts, 
the orders of the collector cannot be held to have been invalid”; See Also 
Tulsidas v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262, 266 U.S. 258 (1923) 
It was for them to establish their exemption from the prohibition of the 
law; for them to satisfy the insular officials charged with the 
administration of the law. If they left their exemption in doubt and 
dispute, they cannot complain of a decision against it. 
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reading requirement to enter the country.63 The Immigration Act of 
1917 greatly expanded the types of immigrants excluded from 
immigration, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this 
argument. 64 The important takeaway is that the courts continued to 
defer to the executive administrative agency’s decision-making 
without offering anything other than abuse of discretion review. 
There were several cases the Court did take up after the act became 
law. These mostly had to do with defining who would qualify as a 
white person under section 2169 of the Immigration Act of 1917.65 
Being a free white person had become requisite after the passage of 
the act to become naturalized as a United States citizen. 66 In 
addition to race, this act also imposed a literacy test on new 
immigrants, increased the taxes paid by new immigrants, and 
defined an entire region, known as the Asiatic Barred Zone, 
ineligible to immigrate to the United States.67 Again, the courts 
would avoid ruling on the merits of such policy and only interpret 
the intent of Congress when judging who met the legislative criteria 
Following a long line of decisions of the lower Federal 
courts, we held that the words imported a racial and not an 
individual test and were meant to indicate only persons of 
what is popularly known as the Caucasian race. But, as there 
pointed out, the conclusion that the phrase ‘white persons' 
and the word ‘Caucasian’ are synonymous does not end the 
matter. It enabled us to dispose of the problem as it was there 
presented, since the applicant for citizenship clearly fell 
outside the zone of debatable ground on the negative side; 
but the decision still left the question to be dealt with, in 
                                                          
63 See Immigration Act of 1917, Sec. 2 
http://library.uwb.edu/Static/USimmigration/39%20stat%20874.pdf Sec. 2 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 43 S.Ct. 338 (1923); Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).  
66 Immigration Act of 1917, Section 2. 
67 Immigration Act of 1917 Sec. 2-4. 
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doubtful and different cases, by the process of judicial 
inclusion and exclusion.68 
The process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, or who does and 
does not meet the definition of a statute, continued the tradition of 
judicial deference on questions of immigration policy.  
Congress would amend the 1917 act in 1924 creating nation-
based limitations on the number of immigrants able to enter the 
United States each year.69 While a quota system had been in place 
for over three years, this act would further reduce the number of 
immigrant visas available.70 Additionally, Congress would retool 
the formula on which immigration quotas were set.71 This change 
gave preference to immigrants from the British Isles and Western 
Europe while reducing the number available for Eastern and 
Southern Europeans.72 Unsurprisingly, Congress also barred 
completely those that would not be able to naturalize. This included 
the majority of Asia.73 
The Court would break no new ground while the Immigration 
Act of 1924 remained good law. They remained an assessor of 
applicability, deferring to the powers of Congress to create law and 
those tasked through the office of the executive to enforce it. The 
majority of cases for this time period, though, revolved less around 
the immigrants than in times past. These cases largely ruled on 
applicability of fines to those ships carrying immigrants into the 
country that did not have authorization to enter.74 The Act itself had 
                                                          
68 U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 208 (1923) (Internal quotations 
omitted). 
69 Immigration Act of 1924 (The Reed-Johnson Act), Office of the Historian, 






74 See, e.g., U.S. v. Cosulich Line, 76.F2d 128 (2nd Cir. 1935); International 
Mercantile Marine Co. v. Elting, 67 F.2d 886 (2nd Circuit 1933).  
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supplied straightforward restrictions on entry and was difficult to 
challenge on discriminatory grounds.75 For example, citizens that 
had married abroad after the act’s passage were unable to bring their 
spouse into the country if they were a banned nationality.76 Even if 
they were half white.77 Immigrants were barred from reentry even if 
they had lived in the United States for nearly fifteen years.78 
 Each of these examples share the fact that the courts only sought 
to define the law’s application, and not what the law was. The 
United States would operate under the framework of the 
Immigration Act of 1924 for nearly thirty years. The Second World 
War would force American legislators to reexamine their stance on 
immigration as labor shortages during the war and the need to 
provide relief to decimated European villages and populations after 
the war put pressure on the United States to ease its immigration 
requirements.  
F. World War II & The Need For Change 
 As World War II took much of the United States’ workforce 
to Europe and the Pacific, the country was left scrambling to find a 
source of replacement labor that could meet the substantial need of 
American farms and industry. Starting in 1942, the United States 
government entered into an agreement with Mexico to solve the 
                                                          
75 See Immigration Act of 1924. For example, nation quotas were created based 
on a percentage of immigrants coming from those countries in 1890. Most of 
Asia was barred from entry either through the “Asiatic Barred Zone” of the Act 
or earlier Chinese Exclusion legislation. If you were barred or immigrated from 
a country whose quota had exhausted you would not be allowed into the 
country.  
76 See Haff v. Tom Tang Shee, 63 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1933). 
77 See Bonham v. Bouiss, 161 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1947).  
78 U.S. ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell,284 U.S. 279 (1932). Holding that there is no 
right to enter the United States unless that right has been granted by the United 
States. In not being able to produce a return permit or immigration visa due to 
leaving prior to the effective date of the act, Plaintiffs were unable to show they 
had secured that right and were deported back to Greece. 
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labor issues caused by the war.79 Known as Braceros, hundreds of 
thousands of these agricultural workers entered the United States 
through 1964 when the United States completely overhauled its 
immigration policies.80 While a continuing need for labor was one 
of the motivating factors for reevaluating United States immigration 
policy in the early 1950’s, the affect of World War II  on Europe and 
the Far East was likely a larger impetus for change. 81  Legislation 
passed in the in the 1940’s had such an intent and that was carried 
forward in the Congressional intent of the 1952 act. As 
Representative Joseph Farrington stated during floor debate while 
discussing the lifting of nationality restrictions as contained in the 
INA of 1952 
[T[he enactment of this law will bring great change in the 
attitude of those people…[the act’s] passage is vitally 
important from the standpoint of our future in the Pacific 
because it will remove what has always been a serious source 
of irritation in our relationship…[t]he value of such a step is 
indisputable.  
In 1943…to get the support of the Chinese in the fight 
against the totalitarian powers, the House repealed the racial 
restrictions in our immigration and naturalization 
law…followed in 1946 by similar action in regard to the 
Filipinos and the people of India.  
It provides in addition the solution of several difficult 
problems. One of these has been created by the marriage 
of…American citizens serving in the Armed Forces in the 
                                                          
79 Overview of INS History, USCIS HISTORY OFFICE AND LIBRARY, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 9, last accessed 3/11/2019, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy/
Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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Pacific and Far East to girls of races now ineligible for 
citizenship.82 
It is also important to note that within the same debate, 
Representatives of the House comment on the dangers of granting 
the executive the power to halt immigration. This provision was 
included in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Its 
inclusion gave some Representatives pause. Emmanuel Celler, a 
Representative from New York, comments that, “[t]he President has 
that right in times of peace, in times of war, in times of emergency, 
and in time of nonemergency, to shut off immigration…we should 
very carefully scrutinize that provision”.83 Upon another 
Representative pointing out that the provision requires immigration 
to be “detrimental” to the United States, Representative Celler 
responds, “But what is meant by ‘detrimental’ is left entirely to the 
judgment, or shall I say the possible imagination of the chief 
executive officer”.84, 85 
 The Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1952 would be 
voted, adopted, and signed into law toward the end of the year. It 
contained the provision to grant the President authority to halt 
immigration when it is detrimental to the interests of the United 
States. It also maintained the National Origins quota system began 
in the 1920’s, though over the objection of many members of 
Congress. Congressman Peter Rodino from New Jersey closed his 
comments on the House floor by stating “immigration is so basic to 
our welfare…international relations and…growth and development 
of the country that we must make every effort to place the national 
need above personal prejudices in considering this legislation.86 
Perhaps the most important result of the 1952 act was the 
                                                          
82 P 4304 Congressional Record https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-
CRECB-1952-pt4/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1952-pt4-1.pdf 
83 Id at 4305 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id at 4311. 
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codification of the nation’s immigration laws in a single section of 
the United States Code.87 
G. Immigration in The Era of Civil Rights 
 As Representative Rodino alluded, Congress would need to 
return to the immigration policy debate only thirteen years later. 
New questions arose due mainly to the perception of racial bias 
within the immigration system. The National Origins Formula had 
been used to derive immigration quotas since the passage of the 
Emergency Quota Act of 1921.88 This would be addressed in 1965 
through amendments to the 1952 act introduced by Emanuel 
Celler.89 These amendments would do several important things for 
immigration law. First, they abolished the National Origins Formula 
in favor of a numerical cap for all immigrants. They also provided 
for seven classifications to prioritize entry while allowing 
immediate family members of United States citizens and special 
immigrants to avoid being subject to cap restrictions. These 
amendments had the de facto effect of limiting immigration from 
the western hemisphere for the first time, as immigrants from Latin 
America were subject to a cap on immigrant entry for the first time. 
90 Additionally, the amendments would consolidate more power 
over immigration in the executive branch. The Department of Labor 
would be required to certify a labor shortage in order for visas to be 
granted to noncitizens looking for labor in the United States. This 
was required whether the labor was skilled or unskilled.91  
                                                          
87 See H.R. 5678 Sec. 403 (82nd). Prior to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act, immigration legislation was found in different sections throughout the code. 
This legislation organized those regulations into Title 8 of the United States 
Code while repealing them from the sections they had previously been found in.  
88Emergency Quota Act of 1921 Sec. 2(a). 
89 The Immigration act was alternatively known as the Hart-Celler act. 
Emmanuel Celler (NY) and Philip Hart (MI) were its two main sponsors in the 
House of Representatives and the namesakes of the bill. 
90 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3407978/ 
91  § 212(a)(l4) of P.L. 414. 
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 Despite the changes to the 1952 version of the act, 
challenges still came before the courts. Often these actions involved 
plaintiffs requesting the courts overrule the administrative orders 
issued in their cases. In a continuation of previous policy, the courts 
would refuse. The plenary powers granted to the executive agencies 
regarding their immigration decisions were absolute and not subject 
to judicial review. The courts would reaffirm this idea in several 
cases of the era stating 
It has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to 
make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those 
who possess those characteristics which Congress has 
forbidden.92 [O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative 
power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the 
admission of aliens.93 [I]t is important to underscore the 
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration 
legislation.94”  
The Supreme Court’s continued refusal to interject itself into the 
discussion of Congress’s power to regulate immigration has become 
a major factor in the executive’s ability to direct policy through the 
exercising of administrative control. While issues were slow to build 
in the first hundred years of immigration control, the Berlin Wall 
would not be the only barrier of note Ronald Reagan would have a 
hand in bringing down.95 The breakdown of the wall between the 
administrative wing of government and the chief executive has 
significantly increased the control the chief executive has over 
immigration policy over the last forty years.  
                                                          
92 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) quoting Oceanic Navigation 
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339, 29 S.Ct. 671, 676, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909). 
93 Boutilier v. Immig. and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967). 
94 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
95 Ronald Reagan would be the first president to insist on the unitary theory of 
the executive being the correct view of the executive’s relationship to the 
administrative wing of government, breaking down the wall between the 
executive and the administrative agencies of the executive. 
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H. Immigration Act Of 1990 and Policy Toward the Present 
Immigration would continue to be a point of discussion and 
policy over the next twenty-five years.96 The Vietnam War created 
its own unique considerations dealing with immigrants & refugees 
from Southeast Asia.97 The Haitian “Freedom Flotilla” or Mariel 
boatlift of 1980 would combine with the ongoing issues of 
undocumented immigration across the Southern border to compel 
Congressional action on naturalization and immigration in 1986.98 
It would ultimately be the economy’s need for skilled workers that 
would drive amendments to immigration policy in 1990.99 
As President George H.W. Bush stated during his speech before 
signing the bill, "Immigration isn't just a link to America's past, it's 
also a bridge to America's future. This bill provides for vital 
increases for entry on the basis of skills, infusing the ranks of our 
scientists and engineers and educators with new blood, and new 
ideas.100" The Immigration and Nationality Ac of 1990 would create 
several new employment-based nonimmigrant visa categories while 
nearly tripling the number of those visas available.101 The act also 
revised the admission preferences by splitting them into three 
different categories: family-sponsored, employment-based, and 
diversity immigrants determined by a lottery. The family-sponsored 
                                                          
96 See e.g., Armed Forces Naturalization Act (1968); Indochina Migration and 
Refugee Assistance Act (1975); Amerasian Immigration Act (1982); 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986). 
97 See Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance (1975); Amerasian 
Immigration Act (1982).  
98 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  
99 George Bush, Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, The 
American Presidency Project, last accessed 3/11/2019,  
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265173. “This legislation meets several 
objectives of this Administration’s domestic agenda – [including] cultivation of 
a more competitive economy….This legislation will encourage the immigration 
of exceptionally talented people, such as scientists, engineers, and educators.” 
100 George H.W. Bush, Immigration Act of 1990 Signing Ceremony Speech, 
November 29, 1990, last accessed 3/11/2019,  https://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4737330/george-hw-bush-immigration  
101 § 201-223 of P.L. 101-649.  
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and employment-based immigrants were each assigned 4 
subcategories that were subsequently ranked in preference for their 
corresponding visas.102  
More importantly, Congress granted the executive the ability to 
grant temporary, protected, or deferred enforced departure status to 
any group of immigrants that met certain criteria. These 
designations allowed those that received it certain benefits, such as 
work authorization and protection from deportation.103 In doing so, 
this act ceded more Congressional authority to make immigration 
decisions to the executive branch.  
While there have been other legislative actions aimed at 
immigration since 1990, the examples provided sufficiently 
illustrate the court system’s reticence to interject itself in 
immigration policy decisions and the allocation of authority by 
Congressional action to executive actors. Having established these 
practices, the idea that unitary theory has accelerated an inevitable 
collision between the Constitution and the executive as chief 
administrator may be explored. 
THE RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
A. The Supreme Court Hands Control to the Executive 
The scope of managing a country which stretched from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific coasts and covered an area of nearly four 
million square miles could not have its laws effectively enforced by 
the office of the executive as a singular entity. Since the Presidency 
of George Washington, it has been customary for the executive to 
select advisors as members of his cabinet.104 These advisors would 
serve as the secretary in charge of their department.105 Washington 
                                                          
102 Id. 
103 §601-603 of P.L. 101-649.  
104 Art. II, Sec. 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States. 
105 Id. 
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began this tradition by naming four members to his cabinet.106 
Executive agencies have been considerably expanded since the 
country’s founding and are comprised of at least fifteen major 
departments with several smaller additional agencies.107 There are 
also legislative agencies, which are created by Congress, that the 
executive may have some control over.108 While it is important to 
know they exist to avoid confusion, they are not particularly relevant 
to the present discussion. The major distinction between the 
executive and legislative agencies is that the executive agency 
secretaries serve at the pleasure of the executive as the Supreme 
Court ruled in 1926.109 The 1935 case Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States put a limit on the executive’s ability to remove the 
heads of agencies, and allowed for Congress to prescribe the 
circumstances under which the heads may be dismissed.110 The 
Court summarizes the executive’s power of dismissal thusly 
“To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers Case, 
which sustains the unrestricted power of the President to remove 
purely executive officers, and our present decision that such power 
does not extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall 
                                                          
106 See George Washington’s Mount Vernon, Cabinet Members, last accessed 
3/11/2019, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-
encyclopedia/article/cabinet-members/ 






109 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
[W]e have no hesitation in holding that conclusion to be correct; and it 
therefore follows that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it 
attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers 
who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same 
effect was equally so. 
Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
110 Humphreys Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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remain a field of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for 
future consideration and determination as they may arise.”111 
As discussed above, the earliest immigration policies were 
enforced by the Secretary of the Treasury.112 Congress gave the 
executive branch wide latitude to create rules and policies within the 
scope of the power they granted.113 Congress also allowed for the 
creation of an administrative judiciary, which adjudicated decisions 
based on administrative policy.114 The federal judiciary’s decision 
not to interject itself into this process effectively gave administrative 
policy the power of law.115 As a matter of course, the administrative 
arm of the executive branch would serve as its own legislator, 
enforcer, and adjudicator.116 Once Congress ceded authority to the 
executive via legislation, it became very difficult to reclaim. Any 
legislation attempting to limit the executive’s power would need to 
be signed into law by the executive. This creates a significant 
conflict of interest.117  
Congress attempted to assert itself as a check against unfettered 
executive policy making authority. For several decades, Congress 
inserted legislative vetoes into proposals passing through both 
houses. These vetoes allowed Congress to overrule administrative 
decision making without executive oversight.118 Incidentally, a 
challenge to one of these vetoes would be brought under the 1952 
Immigration and Naturalization Act decades after its passing.  
                                                          
111 Id at 632.  
112 Supra, Note 47  
113 See A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, Office of the Federal Register, 
3/11/2019, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf  
114 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 556. 
115 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 551 et seq. 
116 5 U.S.C.A. Sec 551 et seq.; 5 U.S.C.A 771 et seq.  
117 Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution. 
118 Legislative Veto, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Cornell Law School, 
3/11/2019, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/legislative_veto 
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INS v. Chadha would be granted certiorari by the Supreme Court 
and a decision would be issued in 1983. Congress had inserted a 
legislative veto within the 1952 act. Upon the suspension of the 
respondent’s deportation order, Congress sought to exercise its 
authority to review based on the language of the legislative veto 
provision.119 Respondent was ordered deported after a single house 
of Congress voted to lift the suspension of his deportation. 
Respondent sued questioning the constitutionality of the legislative 
veto provision and argued that the decision to lift the suspension of 
his deportation amounted to a legislative action. As a legislative 
action it would constitutionally require passage by a majority of both 
houses and presented to the executive.120 The Burger Court agreed 
with Respondent. The Court found the legislative veto provision in 
the language of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
unconstitutional. The Court did not relegate their decision simply to 
the case before them. Instead, it issued a broad ruling striking down 
Congress’s ability to invoke legislative veto provisions as 
unconstitutional.121 This ruling would have a profound effect on 
Congressional ability to check executive agency decision-making. 
A great number of the legislative actions ceding power to the 
executive branch had included veto provisions since the 1930’s. 
These provisions had been a major Congressional check on 
unfettered executive administrative authority.122  
The judiciary would also continue its practice of deferring to the 
decisions of the administrative bodies acting under the authority of 
Congress. In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
the Court would set a standard of review in questions of 
administrative decision validity.123 This 1984 case developed a two-
part test for judicial intervention in administrative decision-making. 
                                                          
119 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
120 Supra, Note 117 at 949. 
121 Id at 951-959. 
122 Supra, Note 118. 
123 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
(1984). 
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The first prong evaluated whether Congress had granted the 
authority to decide in direct language. If this test was met, no further 
investigation was warranted. The courts would defer. If not, the 
second prong would evaluate whether the decision fell under the 
authority granted by Congress. If it did, the courts would defer to 
the administrative body’s reasonable interpretation of 
Congressional language.124 This is essentially the intelligible 
principle standard created by the 1928 decision in J.W. Hampton v. 
United States.125 The Chevron test, as it became known, established 
very narrow grounds on which the courts would intercede. 
Particularly, if the decisions made by an administrative body 
exceeded the scope of authority granted by Congress. 126 
Chadha in conjunction with Chevron significantly weakened 
Congressional ability to retake authority it had previously delegated. 
Under this new standard, the executive had to be willing to 
relinquish authority already granted.  The Presentment Clause along 
with Bicameralism would make clawing back delegated authority a 
very steep hill to climb. Additionally, legislation granting the 
authority was often created in broad terms to give the administrative 
wing of the executive branch wide latitude to perform their assigned 
                                                          
124 Id at 842-843. 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
125 J.W. Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). Congress must give 
administrative agencies an intelligible principle on which to base their 
regulations when granting them the ability to regulate. 
126 See supra, Note 121.  
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duties. There were often few statutory checks on the actions the 
executive could take. The Court could have been a major obstacle 
for the executive, but the Chevron decision established there were 
very limited circumstances in which the courts would frustrate 
administrative decision-making. By 1986, the executive appeared to 
be in control of the federal bureaucracy and there appeared to be 
little recourse the other branches could or would take to wrest away 
control.  
While Congress has passed legislation to force administrative 
authorities to report actions directly to Congress, Congressional 
influence was otherwise limited. 127 The Administrative Procedure 
Act was passed in 1946 to standardize the way in which 
administrative regulations were created and give more transparency 
to the process.128 The public notice and comment requirements 
located in § 553 and the adjudication limitations located in § 554 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act serve to put restraints on the 
actions administrative agencies may effectuate, but still provide 
little recourse for Congressional influence.129  
                                                          
127 See Todd Garvey & Daniel Sheffner, Congress’s Authority to Influence and 
Control Executive Branch Agencies, p.15-16,  CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, 2018, last accessed 3/23/2019, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45442.pdf.  
The Constitution’s required lawmaking procedures impose significant 
limitations on how Congress and its component parts may wield power 
over agencies. The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress must 
exercise its legislative power in compliance with the finely wrought 
and exhaustively considered procedure set forth in Article I, Section 7, 
which provides that every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be 
presented to the President of the United States.  
128 5 U.S.C.A.Chapter 5 §§ 500 – 596.  
129 Id at §§ 553 – 554. Requires agencies to submit proposed rules for 
publication in the federal register and allow for a period of public comment. 
Additionally, section 554 defines the rights of a party facing adjudication by an 
administrative court. Provides for such rights as notice of time and place of a 
hearing and the right to present a defense and evidence to support it.  
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With Congress having few remaining options to check the 
authority of executive branch administrative rule-making and the 
courts granting wide deference for agencies to act within the bounds 
of their statutorily granted authority, the executive office could 
potentially assert itself over that process and guide policy decisions 
that carry the force of law. While previous executives had done so 
to a limited extent, President Ronald Reagan’s adamant assertion 
that administrative agencies were governed by the Unitary Theory 
of the Executive would aggressively seek to consolidate power into 
the chief executive’s hands.130  
B. The Unitary Theory of the Executive 
Ronald Reagan was not the first president to invoke inherent 
authority over agencies under the banner of the executive. There are 
examples throughout the history of the presidency o chief executives 
justifying their actions by claiming authority over the agencies 
operating under the executive wing of government.131 The 
difference with President Reagan was that he asserted unitary theory 
as a central piece of his presidential power and sought to exercise it 
to direct governmental policy from the White House. Reagan 
attempted to do so significantly more often than any other modern 
executive before him.132 
Current Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito was Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan administration. During his 
confirmation hearing to become a member of the nation’s highest 
court, he was asked about unitary theory by the late Senator Ted 
Kennedy. Justice Alito’s response is a clear and succinct summary 
of the administration’s justification of the idea that all power of the 
executive flows first through the President.  
                                                          
130 Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 BOSTON 
UNIV. L. REV 523, 525-534, 3/11/2019, http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-
archive/bulr/documents/krent.pdf 
131 Id at 523-524. 
132 Id at 525-527. 
36 | P a g e  
 
I think it’s important to draw a distinction between two very 
different ideas. One is the scope of Executive power . . .. [W]e 
might think of that as how big is this table, the extent of the 
Executive power. [W]hen you have a power that is within the 
prerogative of the Executive, who controls [it]? [T]he concept of 
[the] unitary Executive doesn’t have to do with the scope of 
Executive power…It has to do with who within the Executive 
branch controls the exercise of Executive power, and the theory 
is the Constitution says the Executive power is conferred on the 
President.133 
The central idea of the unitary theory is that the exercise of executive 
authority must first be authorized by the President based upon the 
constitutional delegation of powers. It follows, then, that in order for 
an agency under the banner of the executive to act, it must do so 
only once it has authorization to do so.  
Arguments against this theory include the President’s duty to 
faithfully execute federal law. It is true that the executive branch 
may not enforce a law in a way which directly contradicts the 
statutory language.134 Additionally, the Written Opinions Clause 
suggests that the executive may seek the opinions of his department 
heads in order to make an informed decision.135 When these two 
clauses are read together, they would seem to suggest that the 
Framers anticipated that the executive would be making decisions 
in regard to enforcement of laws absent an explicit directive from 
the legislative branch.136 Absent an explicit directive the executive 
would be free to execute the laws—and direct agencies operating 
                                                          
133 John Harrison, The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power, 126 
YALE UNIV. L. REV., 3/11/2019,  https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-
unitary-executive-and-the-scope-of-executive-power. 
134  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (empowering the President to "take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed"). 
135 Article II of the United States Constitution.  
136 This note will not seek to address whether unitary theory is reflective of the 
Framers’ intent. For those interested in pursuing additional information, the 
following resources are available: Calabresi & Woo 
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under his authority—as he or she may so choose within the bounds 
prescribed by legislative authority.  
C. The Unitary Executive and the Convergence of the 
Administrative Branch and the Presidency. 
The Constitution’s framers were wary of any branch of 
government having unchecked power, particularly Congress.137 The 
framer’s split Congress into two houses in order to strike 
compromise between states wanting population based 
representation and states wanting equal representation, but also to 
bifurcate Congressional power and provide the legislature an 
internal check against itself.138 The framers were most concerned 
that Congress would grow too powerful and consume the other 
branches.139 Perhaps in weakening Congressional authority by 
strictly outlining the powers granted, the framers may have left too 
much uncertainty in the authority delegated to the Executive. As 
demonstrated above, those powers relating to immigration have 
been checked by the courts even less frequently—whether 
undertaken by Congressional or Executive actors. 
The Framer’s assumption that a strong Congress would check 
the executive’s power, the Constitution’s silence on immigration 
authority outside of naturalization, and the court’s policy of 
deference on immigration policy questions has created a perfect 
                                                          
137 See, e.g., James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers 
#51, 1788, 3/11/2019, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.” As 
the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, 
the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should 
be fortified.”   
138 See, e.g., Jeremy C. Pope and Shawn Treier, Reconsidering the Great 
Compromise at the Federal Conventionof 1787: Deliberation and Agenda 
Effects on the Senate and Slavery, 55 American Journal of Political Science 2, 
289-306, 291, 3/11/2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025052. “portrayed the 
convention as consciously choosing a bicameralism to restrain the large state 
from taking control of the government, [b]y this mixture of states and people.” 
139 Id. 
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storm of sorts for present day practice.140, 141, 142 In Chadha, the 
Supreme Court struck down longstanding Congressional checks on 
the powers delegated to the executive known as legislative vetoes.  
This decision revoked Congressional authority to execute any 
meaningful unilateral action to overrule post-delegation decisions 
made by the Executive.143 Congress had been placing these vetoes 
in legislation since the 1930’s. They served as a Congressional 
check on Executive overreach. Once they were ruled unenforceable, 
though, consequences only marginally considered when making 
such delegations were unleashed. Prior to Chadha, Congress relied 
on the legislative veto as their main source of unilateral control over 
the powers they delegated to the Executive. Faced with the vetoes’ 
unenforceability, Congress was now tasked with the proposition of 
creating legislation granting Congressional oversight and then either 
convince the Executive to sign that legislation or muster enough 
support to overcome its veto. Congress no longer had a recourse 
where it was the sole actor.144 
Future Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer defined the 
problems created by the historical unraveling of these events during 
a 1990 panel on Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive.145 In 
discussing the test used to justify Congressional power delegations 
to administrative agencies, Breyer reaffirms that the courts have 
                                                          
140 See, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AMERICAN 
UNIV. L. REV 2, 260-304, 3/11/2019,  
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://w
ww.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1005&context=aulr.  
141 See, e.g., David Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine 
Endures,  
142 Id.  
143 See, e.g., Girardeua A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. 




145 Stephen Breyer, Laurence Silberman, E. Donald Elliot, and Terry Eastland, 
Panel I: Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive, 68 WASHINGTON. 
UNIVERSITY L. Q. 495 (1990). 
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historically been unwilling to strike down legislation delegating 
authority to the executive provided 
1) the power is at least arguably related to the basic function of 
that branch;146 2) the specific text of the Constitution does not 
specifically forbid the delegation;147 and 3) the delegation of the 
power to one branch does not unreasonably interfere with the 
ability of a different branch to carry out its constitutionally 
mandated duties.148, 149 
A year prior to this panel, the Supreme Court ruled on issues 
regarding delegation of powers to the other branches in United 
States v. Mistretta.150 Mistretta involved a challenge to 
Congressional delegation of power to the executive for determining 
mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. In cases involving 
delegation of power, the Court developed a test for gauging the 
constitutionality of such legislation. This test is referenced above as 
the intelligible principle doctrine. J.W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. 
United States developed this doctrine and allowed for circumvention 
of the nondelegation doctrine so long as Congress "lay down by 
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [act] is directed to conform."151, 152 It is important to 
note that a delegation of authority has not been struck down since 
1935 under the nondelegation doctrine and the principle of 
                                                          
146 See Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec., 281 U.S. 464 (1930). 
147 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Striking down the portions of the 
Tenure of Office Act that attempted to limit the President’s ability to remove 
heads of executive agencies at his pleasure. 
148Supra, Note 140.  
149 Supra, Note 142 at 496.  
150  United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
151 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
152 Id at 409. 
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nondelegation has long been considered dormant.153, 154 There have 
been repeated opportunities for the Supreme Court to revive the 
doctrine as lower federal courts have ruled against the 
constitutionality of a Congressional delegation by invoking the 
nondelegation doctrine, but the Supreme Court has consistently 
overruled attempts to breathe life back into the standard.155  
Thus far this note has established four irrefutable truths in the 
present relationship among the three branches of government.: 1) 
Congress has ultimate authority over immigration; 2) Congress may 
delegate their authority to executive agencies; 3) the Court is 
reluctant to interject itself into immigration policy or check 
Congressional power to delegate their rule-making authority; and 4) 
Congress may not attempt to circumvent bicameralism or the 
Presentment Clause in attempts to retake its already delegated 
authority. These four points of fact established the criteria needed 
for a strong-willed executive to steer policy making in areas under 
executive agency control. In 1980, Ronald Reagan would defeat 
Jimmy Carter in a landslide victory. Reagan had run on a platform 
of a reduction in government interference. In a climate of high 
unemployment and double-digit inflation Regan asserted, “In this 
present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; 
                                                          
153 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935).Striking down a delegation of Congressional authority to the executive as 
too broad. 
154 See, e.g., Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 
165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 379 (2017). Arguing that the 
Supreme Court has rendered the nondelegation doctrine inoperable by 
repeatedly overturning lower court decisions finding delegations of authority by 
Congress unconstitutional.  
155 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233-34 
(2015) (overturning the D.C. Circuit’s decision regarding the unconstitutionality 
of the Passenger Railroad Investment and Improvement Act of 2008’s 
delegation of authority); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 474 
(2001) (finding that “[t]he scope of discretion [the Clean Air Act provision in 
question] allows is in fact well within the outer limits of our nondelegation 
precedents”). 
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government is the problem.156” After his election, Reagan would 
look to unitary theory to justify his unilateral actions attempting to 
reduce the size of the federal bureaucracy. 
D. Reagan Sets the Standard 
At the outset of this note, several instances of policy directives 
were given starting with President Truman.157 While it is true that 
President Reagan was not the first to utilize the executive’s authority 
over the executive branch’s sub-agencies to drive rule making and 
enforcement choices parallel to their own agenda, he was the first to 
assert his absolute authority to do so.  
In 1974, President Ford initially tasked the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) with considering the financial 
implications of regulatory measures. While placing aspects of 
regulatory financial review under an executively controlled agency, 
this requirement did not insert the Executive into the decision-
making process.158 President Carter would expand on this in 
1978.159 In addition to requiring financial evaluation prior to 
adoption, Carter’s 1978 order required a secondary evaluation after 
implementation, which became known as retrospective regulatory 
review.160 Again, retroactively assessing whether a policy had met 
its goals was not attempting to create executive authorization for 
administrative rules, but Carter’s executive order set the precedent 
for Reagan to further involve the OMB in regulatory decisions161 
                                                          
156 Supra, Note 1.  
157 Supra, Notes 2-8. 
158 E.O. 11821 Sec. 1-2, Nov. 27, 1974; E.O. 11949, Dec. 31, 1976.  
159Jimmy Carter, Improving Government Relations,  E.O. 12044, March 23, 
1978, 3/11/2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-
order-12044-improving-government-regulations.  
160 Id at Sec. 4. 
161 Supra, Note 159. The roles given to executive agencies in determining the 
effectiveness of their regulatory efforts by both Presidents Ford and Carter 
placed executive directives on a path toward Presidential control. In 1981, 
Reagan only had to assert control over the agencies to gain control of their 
quasi-legislative authority.  
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In 1981, President Reagan would assign the OMB additional 
responsibilities, causing it to serve as a clearinghouse for regulatory 
rule creation.162 This order was the most successful and long-lasting 
of Reagan’s unilateral policy initiatives to reduce the size and 
spending of the federal government. Reagan’s redefining of the 
responsibilities of the OMB and its sub-agency the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) placed the executive as 
the de facto decision-maker on regulatory policy. Both these offices 
fell directly under presidential control as members of the Executive 
Office of the President. 163 As part of the order, Reagan tasked the 
OIRA with finding wasteful regulations and eliminating them. In 
addition, proposed regulations were required to be both in line with 
the executive agenda and cost-effective for the OIRA to grant 
approval for adoption.164 In 1984, Reagan would issue his second 
Executive Order aimed at executive administrative review.165 
Reagan sought to create a master regulatory plan, compiled by the 
OIRA , which required agencies to submit any anticipated 
regulatory actions for the upcoming year.166 At the time, Reagan’s 
assertion of his control over the unnamed fourth branch of 
government was viewed as a radical departure from historical 
practice. Such choices would place Ronald Reagan among those 
presidents that sought to substantially expand the powers of the 
presidency, or “the Imperial Presidents.”167 
                                                          
162 Ronald Reagan, Federal Regulation, E.O. 12291 Sec. 6, February 17, 1981, 
3/11/2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-
12291-federal-regulation 
163See Executive Branch Organizational Chart, 3/11/2019, 
https://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov/ReadLibraryItem.ashx?SFN=Myz95sTy
O4rJRM/nhIRwSw==&SF=VHhnJrOeEAnGaa/rtk/JOg== 
164 Supra, Note 162. 
165 E.O 12498, 1984 
166 Id.  
167 See, e.g., Julian E. Zelizer, The Conservative Embrace of Presidential Power, 
88 Boston University L. Rev. 499, 500, 3/11/2019, 
http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/zelizer.pdf. 
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Through executive order, President Reagan bestowed his office 
with the ability to centrally review regulatory proposals made by 
executive agencies and force those proposals to be in line with the 
goals and policies of the current administration.168 Additionally, 
while the ultimate rule making authority likely remained in the 
hands of the agencies, the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs has actually reported great success in convincing agencies to 
adopt their favored regulations.  
While Reagan largely failed to reduce the size of the federal 
government, his policies did slow its expansion—while turning the 
country into a debtor nation.169 Reagan’s attempts to reign in the 
federal government through executive order and control of the 
federal bureaucracy’s rule-making apparatus opened a Pandora’s 
box of sorts. While it was expected that George H.W. Bush, 
Reagan’s vice president, would continue down a similar path, what 
surprised many was the continued expansion of these practices 
under subsequent Democratic executives. 
E. Expansion After Reagan 
Bill Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush in the Presidential 
election of 1992. President Clinton would address the administrative 
rule-making process in September of 1993 with his own Executive 
Order.170 Surprisingly, President Clinton would revise and expand 
the orders issued by President Reagan.171 The first order would 
further define how agencies should expect to establish their 
regulatory prerogatives. Early in the year’s planning cycle, federal 
agencies, aside from independent agencies, were to meet with the 
                                                          
168Supra, Note 162.  
169 Hugh Helco, The Mixed Legacies of Ronald Reagan, 38 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUDIES QUARTERLY VOL. 4, December 2008, 3/21/19, https://www-jstor-
org.proxy.libraries.uc.edu/stable/41219701.23 
170 See E.O. 12866, September 30, 1993.  
171Compare Id, with Supra, Note 162. Executive order 12866 would keep many 
of the same requirements as Reagan’s 1981 order. It would also explicitly direct 
agencies to ensure regulations being considered were in line with the President’s 
goals. 
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Vice President to establish regulatory priority. All regulations—
whether the agency was independent or not—under development or 
review were to be compiled and submitted to OIRA and include 
basic information. Additionally, all agencies were expected to 
prepare a plan of the most significant regulatory actions expected to 
be issued in either proposed or final form in the present year.172  
President Clinton also sought to make sure all executive 
agencies were moving toward the same goals. Clinton tasked the 
OIRA with ensuring that proposed and preexisting significant 
regulations were within the bounds of the law, the President’s 
priorities, and did not conflict with other agencies’ proposed 
rules.173 Proposed rules could not be published in the Federal 
Register until the OIRA had made sure they met these criteria, and 
agencies had to reconsider any rule returned to them by the OIRA.174  
Clinton would issue another order directed toward agency 
rulemaking near the end of his presidency. This order was geared 
toward eliminating regulations that would preempt state law or 
circumvent other principles of federalism.175 Agencies would be 
required to consider regulations based on the principles of 
federalism laid out within the order.176 Agencies were to avoid 
making national policy unless Congress expressly allowed for 
national preemption authority or that Congress alluded that was their 
intent.177 The language of Clinton’s second order was largely 
borrowed from a similar order on federalism issued toward the end 
of Reagan’s second term, though it did insert additional language 
enabling preemption.178 
                                                          
172 Supra, Note 170.  
173 Id.  
174 Id.  
175 E.O. 13132, August 4, 1999.  
176 Id.  
177 Id. 
178 Compare Id, with Supra, Note 165.  
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President Clinton began his Presidency by expanding on 
Reagan’s attempts to assert executive control over the rule-making 
process. Clinton inserted the Vice President into the conversation 
while making sure the OIRA had the authority to reject proposed 
rules and force agencies to revise them. Despite Clinton’s second 
order appearing to limit the scope of agency rule making, in reality 
it was expanded. The previous order issued by Reagan remained in 
effect. President Clinton incorporated a significant amount of that 
order’s language, but also inserted the ability for agencies to issue 
orders that could affect principles of federalism, something not 
previously available.179 Clinton left office having granted more 
authority to the executive to control regulatory action. 
George W. Bush would win the Presidency in 2000 and a year 
after taking office would issue his first order regarding regulatory 
action.180 President Bush sought to consolidate executive control 
over regulatory direction even more extensively than Clinton had in 
1993. Instead of placing the Vice President into the discussion, Bush 
sought to have the executive’s Chief of Staff or director of the OMB 
mandatorily present.181 Each of these positions fell directly under 
the authority of the President and would thus be able to influence 
the process in line with the executive agenda more reliably. The 
Chief of Staff and director of the OMB would always have the threat 
of being replaced hanging over them. This was something the Vice 
President would not have had to consider.  
In 2007, George W. Bush would once again address regulatory 
review through the executive office. Curtis Copeland, a researcher 
for the Congressional Research Service, referred to the changes 
made under this executive order as “the most significant changes to 
the presidential regulatory review process since 1993.”182 Several 
                                                          
179 Compare Supra Note 175, with Supra, Note 162. 
180 E.O. 13258, February 26, 2002 
181 Id. 
182 Curtis W. Copeland, The Law: Executive Order 13422: An Expansion of 
Presidential Influence in the Rulemaking Process, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 
QUARTERLY 3, last accessed 4/3/2019,  
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requirements were added to the regulatory review process at the 
issuance of this order.  
First, all proposed rules had to state an explicit market failure 
which created the regulations need.183 While agencies could identify 
potential causes that created a need for a regulation previously, 
identifying an actual market failure established a higher bar for 
regulatory adoption.184 
The order also required agencies to provide a cost-benefit 
analysis for their regulatory plan in its totality. While Executive 
Order 12866 created the requirement that agencies submit a cost-
benefit analysis for individual regulations, this expanded those 
requirements significantly and represented a much larger 
undertaking than analyzing a few proposed regulations.185 
Additionally, the order placed a presidentially appointed 
regulatory policy officer that had to approve an agency’s agenda of 
regulatory action. While rules specifically authorized through the 
agency head were outside this requirement, this represented a 
significant increase in the executive’s influence over policy 
adoption.186  
The order also required the OIRA to review any agency 
guidance documents with significant economic impact.187 This 
complemented the OIRA’s responsibility to review economically 
significant regulations.  
                                                          
183 Supra, Note 180.  
184 Compare Supra, Note 180, with Supra, Note 162.  
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Id. 
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Finally, the last major piece of the order required agencies, in 
conjunction with the OIRA, to pursue the formal rulemaking process 
for the resolution of complex determinations.188  
While these new requirements significantly tightened the 
executive’s grip over the administrative role of that branch, it would 
be short lived. Barack Obama would repeal both of George W. 
Bush’s orders within the first year of his presidency, returning the 
language to that of Executive Order 12866. Additionally, this 
executive order directed all agencies to discard all policies and 
practices developed to implement those directives created by 
Executive Order 13422.189 
President Obama would issue two additional orders relating to 
executive regulatory review. The first would create the policy of 
retrospective regulatory review.190 This was largely an attempt to 
reduce costs and eliminate redundant or obsolete policy from agency 
regulations. It required agencies to periodically review regulations 
and determine those that could be eliminated.191 Additionally, 
agencies had to be able to make a reasonable determination that the 
results would justify the cost of implementation before adoption. In 
this cost-benefit analysis, the agencies were directed to consider 
hard to quantify ideas such as human dignity and fairness.192 The 
order encouraged integrative and innovative approaches to problem 
solving while stressing flexibility and the objectivity of scientific or 
technological information used to make support regulatory action.193 
Finally, the order established a floor of 60 days for public comment 
period, stressed how important public participation was in the rule-
                                                          
188 In application, this did not change the status quo much, if at all. Agencies had 
always had the power to enter into the formal rulemaking procedure, but this had 
fallen out of favor in the 1970’s.  
189 E.O. 13497, January 30, 2009.  
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making process, and required agencies to make commenting as well 
as proposed rules and their backing materials available online.194  
President Obama’s final order regarding regulatory review 
would come in 2012. This order expanded on Executive Order 
13563’s retrospective review requirements. It expanded on the 
administration’s idea of the process of retrospective review in 
greater detail. 195 This included how agencies should interpret 
policy, include the public in the review process, prioritize policies 
needing review, and keep agencies accountability by requiring 
retrospective review reports be submitted to the OIRA twice a 
year.196 
Before discussing the Trump administration, it is important to 
note the ongoing cycle over the last forty years and five presidents; 
since President Reagan first asserted the idea that the executive had 
singular authority over all executive agencies. Republicans have 
tended to significantly expand the power of the executive to control 
rule-making. Democrats have sought to reverse those policies that 
consolidated rule-making authority in the hands of the executive to 
the largest degree, but then issued their own order expanding 
executive control in a more limited way. This cycle has born out 
each time control of the executive has changed parties since 1980. 
Practically speaking, this means that executive control has been 
continuously expanding and never regressing below the control 
President Reagan initially asserted in his first order.  
The Trump administration, in less than two years, issued more 
Executive Orders relating to executive regulatory review than all of 
his predecessors combined.197 Some of these were concerned with 
dismantling the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) as the Trump 
                                                          
194 Id. 
195 E.O. 13610, May 10, 2012. 
196 Id. 
197 Since taking office in 2017 Donald Trump has issued 11 executive orders 
relating to the regulatory review. His predecessors starting with President Carter 
issued 10.  
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administration fought to have it repealed.198 One of President 
Trump’s first actions upon taking office was to sign an order 
requiring agencies to grant waivers, deferrals, and exemptions to the 
maximum extent of their ability under law.199 This requirement was 
established in very broad terms, requiring the governing agency to 
provide for exemptions, deferrals, or waivers any time a policy 
regarding the ACA created a financial burden. The actual language 
guided agencies to act when the ACA imposed a “fiscal burden on 
any State or a cost, fee, tax, penalty, or regulatory burden on 
individuals, families, healthcare providers, health insurers, patients, 
recipients of healthcare services, purchasers of health insurance, or 
makers of medical devices, products, or medications.”200  
President Trump’s second order would require the elimination 
of two existing regulations for any new regulatory actions to be 
considered.201 It also required the cost of the discontinued 
regulations to offset the cost of any regulations adopted.202 This 
order was targeted toward economically significant rules, and 
required non-compliant agencies to submit a yearly report outlining 
their plan to become compliant.203 All guidance on implementation 
of this policy was to come directly from the OMB.204 
In his third order, President Trump would look to create policy 
regarding the United States financial system.205 Though not directly 
naming it, this order would specifically address regulations created 
as required by the Dodd-Frank Act.206 It created principles by which 
the Treasury Department could revise existing rules and ensure 
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policy was in line with administration goals.207 Additionally, there 
was a reporting requirement requiring the secretary of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the heads Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, to provide regular updates to the 
president on  "the extent to which existing laws, treaties, regulations, 
guidance, reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and other 
Government policies promote the Core Principles and what actions 
have been taken, and are currently being taken, to promote and 
support the Core Principles."208 
The administration’s fourth order would create additional 
positions within agencies. This new position of Regulatory Reform 
Officer was tasked with ensuring Executive Order 13771 was 
implemented, agencies were conducting cost-benefit analyses in 
accordance with Executive Order 12866, effectively reviewing 
enacted policies through the retrospective review requirements of 
Executive Order of 13563, and eliminate programs and activities 
derived from rescinded policy.209 The order would also create 
Regulatory Reform Task Forces, which were concerned with 
identifying regulations that should be eliminated.210 This essentially 
created a mechanism to enforce the requirements of order 13771.  
Executive Order 13781 would continue to attempt to dismantle 
the executive agency regulatory framework. It tasked the OMB with 
developing a comprehensive plan to reorganize the executive branch 
agencies.211 The order provided guidance on how to approach such 
a proposal and provided for public comment.212  
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Subsequent orders carried on in much the same vein. Executive 
Orders relating to environmental regulation,213 tax regulation,214 
regulations regarding the federal collective bargaining process and 
public sector federal unions,215, 216, 217 and the appointment of 
administrative law judges.218 The most recent of those orders is 
perhaps the most consequential as it gave agency heads the capacity 
to appoint judges outside of the merit-based selection process 
typical of most civil service positions.219 
CONCLUSION 
The takeaway from the last forty years of regulatory review 
directives is that each, in its own way, has sought to consolidate 
decision making authority within the Presidency. It has not mattered 
which party was in the White House, if Congress was in opposition 
to the sitting President, or if both houses and the Presidency were 
controlled by the same party. The Chief Executive has acted 
unilaterally to increase his authority over the regulatory framework 
with an increasing frequency and scope. A continuation down this 
path may have no outcome other than a Constitutional showdown.  
The willingness of the Supreme Court to interject itself into 
attempted usurpations of regulatory immigration authority must 
increase. Since Chadha, the ability of the legislative branch has been 
hamstrung, giving legislators few choices other than to maintain an 
approach to governing that had become far too important to 
abandon. By 1984, the administrative state was far too ingrained into 
American society to discard. Even if the legislative branch chose to 
pursue an alternative path, the Presentment Clause required 
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executive acquiescence to a Congressional retaking of authority. A 
requirement unlikely to be met.  
Historically, the Supreme Court has refused to hear cases 
dealing with any issues other than clear error or actions that occur 
outside of the authority delegated by Congress in the immigration 
realm. Most statutes were written with broad terms which gave 
agencies great latitude to act. As the primary administrators and 
regulators of federal law, agencies wield great amounts of power. 
This power had once existed largely extra-executively. Time has 
chipped away at this dichotomy.  The executive and the 
administrative are becoming one; their convergence hastened by the 
adoption of unitary theory by President Reagan in the early 1980’s.  
Exacerbating the issue, Congress currently has little authority 
and limited appetite to check the executive’s continued assumption 
of regulatory control. The checks relied upon since the 1930’s to 
retain control over the authority Congress delegated were deemed 
unconstitutional. The delegations remained, however, absent a 
control mechanism for Congress. The Chadha decision created the 
requirement of an unrealistic outcome to rebalance the scales. The 
executive must willingly give away his authority.  
It is more likely that the Supreme Court will need to discard the 
approach that has placed us here, particularly in regard to 
immigration. As an area with no Constitutional guidance, the Court 
is only bound by its prior decisions.  With the climate presently 
surrounding immigration, a great opportunity is afforded the Court 
to correct the path the country has been placed upon. Absent such a 
change in direction, Congressional relevance will continue to 
dwindle. The executive will wield increasingly more legislative 
power across an ever-expanding scope of regulatory bodies and 
Congress will have little choice but to continue to create them. This 
continued syphoning of power has created a collision course 
between the executive branch and the Supreme Court. Steps should 
be taken to avert a Constitutional showdown by allowing Congress 
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to reassert some form of control over those powers delegated to 
regulatory bodies.    
